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Abstract
We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism that induces two bargain-
ers to be truthful in reporting their reservation prices in a 1st stage.
If these prices criss-cross, the referee reports that they overlap, and
the bargainers proceed to make oers in a 2nd stage. The average of
the 2nd-stage oers becomes the settlement if both oers fall into the
overlap interval; if only one oer falls into this interval, it is the settle-
ment, but is implemented with probability 12 ; if neither oer falls into
the interval, there is no settlement. Thus, if the bargainers reach the
2nd stage, they know their reservation prices overlap even if they fail
to reach a settlement, possibly motivating them to try again.
1 Introduction
How to induce players to go to their \bottom lines" in bargaining is an
age-old problem in the design of a bargaining mechanism. A solution for
sealed-bid auctions is a second-price, or Vickrey, auction [7], whereby the
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high bidder pays the second-highest bid, rendering what the winner pays
independent of what he or she bid. The extension of this idea to Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [6] likewise induces honesty, because the
settlement does not depend directly on what either player oers. Similarly,
Brams and Kilgour [2] show that that when players bid for rooms in a house
in which they share the rent, the \gap procedure" creates a kind of partial
independence, motivating the housemates to make truthful bids that sum
to the total rent of the house.
When only two bargainers haggle over the price of some good or service,
then splitting the dierence between their oers by averaging them does not
induce honesty, because the bargainers each have an incentive to exaggerate
in opposite directions. Indeed, Chatterjee and Samuelson [3] nd a sim-
ple symmetric equilibrium in which exaggeration is piecewise linear in the
bargainers' reservation prices|the settlement prices that would make each
indierent between an agreement or none. In that game, the nal price is
an average of the oers if they overlap (i.e., if the buyer's oer does not
fall below the seller's); otherwise, there is no agreement, and the players
get nothing. Myerson and Satterthwaite [5] prove that this simple mecha-
nism is more ecient than any other, and Leininger, Linhart, and Radner
[4] show that there is an innity of asymmetric equilibria dierent from the
linear symmetric equilibrium of Chatterjee and Samuelson. For background
information on mechanism design, see [6].
In this paper, we give a two-stage mechanism that induces two bargainers
truthfully to reveal their reservation prices to a referee in stage 1. If the
1st-stage oers overlap, there is the potential for an agreement, which is
realized|at the mean of the 2nd-stage oers|if both bargainers' oers fall
in the overlap interval; if only one bargainer's oer falls in this interval, this
oer becomes the agreement with probability 12 , but otherwise not; if neither
bargainer's oer falls in the overlap interval, there is no agreement.
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As we will show, this procedure, like another probabilistic mechanism [1]
that we discuss in section 5, is not as ecient as the one given by Chatterjee
and Samuelson, in part because of the random draw when exactly one oer
falls in the overlap interval. But even if no agreement is realized, our proce-
dure does reveal|if it goes on to stage 2|that the reservation prices of the
bargainers allow for a mutually protable agreement. Another benet of
our mechanism is that there is a positive probability of settlement even for
extreme reservation values; in contrast, bargainers with extreme values have
no incentive to bargain under the Chatterjee-Samuelson procedure, because
there is no possibility of any agreement.
2 The Mechanism
We consider the possible sale of an object by a Seller to a Buyer. If they can
agree on a price p, the object will be transferred from Seller to Buyer, and
the Seller will receive p as compensation. Of course, Seller prefers a higher
p, whereas Buyer prefers a lower p. If they cannot agree on a p, there is no
sale.
For deniteness, we phrase our discussion in terms of a possible sale,
but we note that our mechanism has many applications, such as to the
settlement of a claim by an insured party against an insurer. In that case,
the insured party, which prefers a higher settlement, plays the role of Seller,
and the insurer corresponds to the Buyer.
The Seller's reservation price for the object, S, is the value of a random
variable with cumulative distribution function FS . The Buyer's reservation
price, B, is the value of a random variable with cumulative distribution
function FB. Both FS and FB have support [C;D]. Both players' reservation
prices are private information, and their utilities are quasi-linear, so that if
a sale takes place at price p, Buyer will receive B   p and Seller will receive
p S. If there is no sale, both players receive 0. The players are risk-neutral.
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The mechanism is a two-stage procedure:
Stage 1. The players submit reserves to the referee: Seller submits bS and
Buyer submits bB. The reserves may or may not equal the corresponding
reservation prices (i.e., the 1st-stage submissions are not necessarily truth-
ful). If bS  bB, the overlap interval is [bS; bB], and the procedure moves to
stage 2. If bS > bB, the reserves do not overlap, there is no settlement, and
the procedure ends.
Stage 2. The players submit oers to the referee: Seller submits s, and
Buyer submits b. If both s and b fall in the overlap interval dened in stage
1, there is a sale at price p = s+b2 . If only one of s and b falls in the overlap
interval, the name of one player is selected at random; if the selected player's
oer is the one in the overlap interval, then it is sale price; if not, there is
no sale. If neither oer is in the overlap interval, there is no sale.
This mechanism determines (i) whether there is a sale and (ii) if there
is a sale, at what price. As usual, we model each player as privately learn-
ing its own (true) reservation price (S or B) prior to stage 1, and using
this information to choose its strategy: ((bS; s) for Seller; ( bB; b) for Buyer).
Thus, a strategy for Seller is a pair of functions bS(S) and s(S) that give
the values of its strategic variables as a function of its reservation price.
Similarly, Buyer's strategy can be thought of as two functions, bB(B) and
b(B). We assume that all four of these strategy functions are dierentiable
and increasing in the players' reservation prices.
One strategy for a player weakly dominates another strategy for that
player if the rst yields an expected utility that is at least as great as the sec-
ond, no matter what strategy is chosen by its opponent. A (Bayesian-Nash)
equilibrium is a prole of strategies with the property that, for each player,
the equilibrium strategy maximizes the player's expected utility, given that
the opponent plays according to its equilibrium strategy.
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To represent our mechanism, we use two functions,
t : R4  ! [0; 1] and p : R4  ! R
with the interpretation that t(bS; s; bB; b) is the probability that an agreement
is reached if the 1st-stage reserves are bS and bB, and the 2nd-stage oers are
s and b; similarly, p(bS; s; bB; b) is the price. Note that both bS and s are
functions of Seller's true reservation price S; we have written bS instead ofbS(S), and s instead of s(S), for notational simplicity. Observe that, if t = 0,
the value of p is irrelevant. Using the functions t and p, we can describe our
mechanism formally, as follows:
(t; p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1; s+b2 ) if
bS  s; b  bB;
(12 ; b) if
bS  b  bB < s;
(12 ; s) if b <
bS  s  bB;
(0; 0) otherwise.
(1)
We will assume below that players always choose 2nd-stage strategies
that are at least as \aggressive" as their 1st-stage strategies, i.e., that b  bB
and s  bS. This assumption is innocuous because, by (1), the players'
payos are certain to be 0 if it does not hold, while strategies satisfying
b  bB and s  bS ensure a payo of at least 0.
We can construct a strategically equivalent mechanism by retaining stage
1 and replacing stage 2 by
Stage 20. One player, Seller or Buyer, is chosen at random. If Seller is
chosen, and if Seller's 2nd-stage oer s satises s  bB, then the transaction
takes place at price p = s; if s > bB, then there is no sale. Similarly, if the
player chosen is Buyer, and if Buyer's 2nd-stage oer b satises bS  b, then
the transaction takes place at price p = b; if b < bS, there is no transaction.
We assume that the random selection of a player in stage 20 is indepen-
dent of the players' reservation prices. The equivalence of the two mecha-
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nisms arises because, if stage 20 is followed, the players' expected utilities
are exactly as in (1). For example, if bS  s; b  bB, then Seller's expected
utility is
1
2
(s  S) + 1
2
(b  S) = s+ b
2
  S = p  S;
where p is determined by the rst condition of (1). A similar relation holds
for Buyer. The verication is immediate if the 2nd-stage oer of only one
player, or none, falls in the overlap interval. Below, we will use the stage 2
and stage 20 formulations interchangeably.
3 A Simple Truth-Telling Mechanism
We dene truth-telling as follows:
Denition 1 Seller's strategy (bS; s) is truth-telling if bS(S) = S for all
S 2 [C;D]. Buyer's strategy ( bB; b) is truth-telling if bB(B) = B for all
B 2 [C;D]. A strategy prole (bS; s; bB; b) is a truth-telling equilibrium if
it is an equilibrium and both players' strategies are truth-telling.
Note that truth-telling refers to the players' reserve strategies (1st stage),
not their oer strategies (2nd stage).
A cumulative distribution function for Buyer, FB(x) has a monotone
hazard rate i ddx
F 0B(x)
1 FB(x)  0 for all x 2 [C;D. Similarly, a cumulative distri-
bution function for Seller, FS(x) has a monotone hazard rate i
d
dx
F 0S(x)
FS(x)
 0
for all x 2 [C;D]. If both Buyer's and Seller's distributions satisfy a mono-
tone hazard rate condition, our procedure has a truth-telling equilibrium,
as shown next.
Proposition 1 Any strategy of Seller, (bS; s), is weakly dominated by the
truth-telling strategy (S; s). Any strategy of Buyer, ( bB; b), is weakly domi-
nated by the truth-telling strategy (B; b). If FS() and FB() are strictly in-
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creasing and satisfy a monotone hazard rate condition, then there is a truth-
telling equilibrium in which the players' 2nd-stage oers, s and b are the
solutions of 1 FB(s) = (s S)F 0B(s) and FS(b) = (B b)F 0S(b), respectively.
Moreover, there are no truth-telling equilibria other than (S; s;B; b).
Proof. First we consider the Seller's expected utility, which we calculate
using the procedure of stage 20. The Seller knows the value of S and deter-
mines strategy (s; bS) using the functions s(S) and bS(S). The expectation
must be taken over the Buyer's value B and the random selection of Seller
or Buyer. Therefore, Seller's expected utility given S is
1
2
Z D
b 1(bS)(b(B)  S) dFB(B) +
1
2
Z D
bB 1(s)(s  S) dFB(B); (2)
where the rst integral is associated with the random selection of Buyer (so
the price is b) and the second with the selection of Seller (so the price is
s). The rst integral must be restricted to values of B such that b(B)  bS,
which is equivalent to B  b 1(bS), as indicated in the lower limit. Similarly,
the second integral is restricted to those values of B for which s  bB(B), as
reected in the lower limit.
Consider the information provided by (2) about Seller's choice of strategy
functions. The rst integral of (2) depends on bS(S) but not s, and the second
integral of (2) depends on s(S) but not bS. Therefore, Seller maximizes
its expected utility by choosing bS to maximize the rst integral and s to
maximize the second.
The rst integral of (2) is
I1(bS) = 1
2
Z D
b 1(bS)(b(B)  S) dFB(B):
This integral depends on bS only through its lower limit, so it can be dier-
entiated easily to produce
d
dbS I1(bS) =  12

b(b 1(bS))  S FB 0(b 1(bS))db 1(bS)
dbS
=  12
bS   S FB 0(b 1(bS))db 1(bS)
dbS
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Now FB
0(b 1(bS)) can be assumed positive, as FB() is strictly increasing,
and b 1() is an increasing function because b() is. It follows that I1(bS) is a
strictly increasing function of bS if bS < S and a strictly decreasing function
of bS if bS > S. Thus, for any 2nd-stage (oer) strategy s = s(S) of Seller,
it follows that Seller's expected utility using strategy (bS; s), where bS 6= S,
is not greater than Seller's expected utility using strategy (S; s). Therefore,
we can conclude that any strategy for Seller is weakly dominated by a truth-
telling strategy, and that we can assume that bS(S) = S at equilibrium. A
similar argument for Buyer leads to the conclusion that bB(B) = B can be
assumed at equilibrium.
Now we address Seller's choice of s(S) to maximize the second integral
of (2). With the substitution bB(B) = B, this integral becomes
I2(s) =
1
2
Z D
s
(s  S) dFB(B):
We now dierentiate with respect to s to produce
d
ds
I2(s) =
1
2
h
 (s  S)FB 0(s) +
R D
s dFB(B)
i
=  12 [ (s  S)FB 0(s) + 1  FB(s)] :
Setting this derivative equal to zero and solving for s = s produces the
required condition, using the monotone hazard rate condition for FB().
Moreover, the maximizing value s is clearly unique. An analogous calcu-
lation, utilizing the monotone hazard rate condition for FS(), produces the
condition on b, and again shows that it is the unique maximizer. Thus,
(S; s;B; b) is the unique truth-telling equilibrium.
Our proof that (S; s;B; b) is an equilibrium thus relies on the fact that
non-truth-telling strategies are weakly dominated by truth-telling strategies,
so there must be a truth-telling equilibrium. Then the oer strategies are
obtained by maximizing the players' expected utilities under the assumption
of truth-telling. To understand why truth-telling dominates, note that each
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player benets from maximizing the width of the overlap interval, up to
its reservation price|Seller from below and Buyer from above|in order
to ensure, insofar as possible, that the 2nd-stage bids, s and b, fall in the
interval, thereby meeting a necessary condition for an agreement.
In fact, truthfully reporting one's reservation price in stage 1 is analo-
gous to bidding one's reservation price in a Vickrey auction: Just as a player
cannot win in a Vickrey auction without being the highest bidder, a bar-
gainer cannot reach a settlement unless there is an overlap interval, leading
to stage 2. In each case, a player goes to its bottom line for two reasons: (i)
failing to do so in stage 1 could preclude a favorable outcome in stage 2 (or
cause an unfavorable outcome) and (ii) once in stage 2, the outcome does
not depend on what the player reported in stage 1.
A player's utility, if positive, does not depend on the reserves, bS andbB, submitted in stage 1 but, instead, on its bid, s or b, in stage 2. The
independence between a player's reserve and its oer implies that it can
\aord" to be truthful in stage 1. In fact, a player cannot do worse by
reporting its reservation price truthfully in stage 1, and may do better, so
we say that under our mechanism each player has an incentive to report its
reservation prices truthfully.
The story is dierent, however, in stage 2: Each player will have an
incentive to shade its oer, depending the distribution of the opponent's
reservation price. In the next section, we illustrate, for two particular dis-
tribution functions, how much shading is optimal.
4 Examples
For our examples, we assume C = 0 and D = 1, so that 0  S;B  1.
Example 1 Uniform distribution: FS(x) = FL(x) = x.
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The players' optimal oers, s(S) = 1+S2 and b
(B) = B2 , are shown in
Figure 1 below. Notice that each of these strategies halves the distance
between the reservation prices, S and B (shown as the line S = B) and
the endpoints, 1 and 0 respectively, of the bargaining range. In particular,
Seller never oers below 12 , and Buyer never oers above
1
2 .
S B,
s* S b* B( ), ( )
s* S S( ) = (1 + )/2
S B=
b* B B( ) = /2
Figure 1: Oer Strategies: Example 1
Notice from Figure 1 that if Seller's (true) reservation price is, for exam-
ple, S = 34 , then Seller's 2
nd-stage bid will be s = s(34) =
7
8 at equilibrium,
and there will be a sale with probability 12 if B >
7
8 ; otherwise, there is
no possibility of a sale. Hence, in the 1st-stage, Seller will be indierent
between reporting 34 and, say,
5
8 (provided the 2
nd-stage bid remains s = 78).
Thus, truthful reporting is weakly but not strictly dominant in the 1st stage.
Figure 2 graphs the results of the equilibrium strategies we have identi-
ed for all possible values of S and B. A sale occurs with certainty when
B < 2S and B > 1+S2 ; these two conditions dene the region with darker
shading in Figure 2. Notice that this is the region of small values of S and
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large values of B; the dierence between S and B is so great that the oers
s and b fall in the overlap interval. A transaction occurs with probability
1
2 when 2S < B <
1+S
2 and when
1+S
2 < B < minf2S; 1g, which are the two
regions with lighter shading in Figure 2.
In the rst of these regions (lower left), s > B but b > S, so there is a
sale at p = b when Buyer's name is drawn in stage 20, and no sale otherwise.
Similarly, in the upper right region, s < B and b < S, so there is a sale at
p = s when Seller's name is drawn in stage 20, and no sale otherwise.
S
B
B S=
B S=2
B S= (1 + )/2
B S= + 1/4
Figure 2: Conditions for a Sale: Example 1
It is instructive to compare our mechanism with the Chatterjee-Samuelson
procedure [3]. The Chatterjee-Samuelson procedure produces a transaction,
for certain, if and only if B  S + 14 , which is the area above the dashed
line in Figure 2. To compare mechanisms, we use the expected surplus they
produce, which because of our assumptions equals the total expected utility
of Buyer and Seller after the transaction, if any. For an \ideal" procedure,
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which produces a settlement whenever the players' reservation prices over-
lap, the total surplus is Z 1
0
Z 1
S
(B   S) dSdB = 1
6
:
Myerson and Satterthwaite [5] demonstrated that no mechanism can pro-
duce a larger surplus than the Chatterjee-Samuelson procedure, which givesZ 3
4
0
Z 1
S+ 1
4
(B   S) dBdS = 9
64
:
The surplus from our mechanism is
1
2
Z 1
0
Z 1
1+S
2
(B   S) dBdS + 1
2
Z 1
2
0
Z 1
2S
(B   S) dBdS = 1
8
;
which is 89 = 88:9% of the maximally possible surplus.
But there are other ways to compare mechanisms. One positive feature of
ours is the potential for trade at all possible values of S and all possible values
of B. The Chatterjee-Samuelson procedure does not share this feature.
For instance, if S = 0:8 and B  0:9, a sale occurs with probability 0.5
under our mechanism, but the Chatterjee-Samuelson mechanism rules out
any possibility of a transaction.
Example 2 Power distribution: FS(x) = x
, FB(x) = 1   (1   x), for
;  > 0.
(It is easy to verify that these distributions satisfy the monotone hazard rate
conditions.) Buyer's optimal oer is b = B1+ and Seller's is s
 = 1+S1+ , in
agreement with Example 1, which corresponds to  =  = 1. For example,
when  =  = 2, b(B) = 23B and s
(S) = 13 +
2
3S, and when  =  =
1
2 ,
b(B) = 13B and s
(S) = 23 +
1
3S.
5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated a simple and elegant 2-stage mechanism that induces
two bargainers to be truthful in reporting their reservation prices in the 1st
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stage; if these prices criss-cross, the referee reports that there is an overlap
interval, and the bargainers make oers in a 2nd stage. The mean of these
oers becomes the settlement if they both fall in the overlap interval. If only
one oer does, it is implemented as the settlement price with probability 12 ,
whereas if neither oer does, there is no settlement.
Our mechanism is less ecient than the Chatterjee-Samuelson mecha-
nism, but does have several features to recommend it, including the possi-
bility of a transaction even for extreme reservation prices. Also, the truth-
telling equilibrium we found is unique.
Part of the ineciency of our mechanism stems from the random im-
plementation of a 2nd-stage oer, s or b, as the exchange price when only
one oer falls in the overlap interval. Randomizing the implementation of
a single inside oer is the penalty one pays to render a player's reserve in-
dependent of its oer in the expected-payo calculation, thereby making it
optimal for the player to report truthfully its reservation price. This inde-
pendence would be broken, and it would be suboptimal for a player truthfully
to report its reservation price, if single inside oers were implemented with
certainty.
Brams and Kilgour [1] analyze other mechanisms that induce two bar-
gainers to be truthful, including a \bonus procedure" in which a third party
induces the bargainers to be truthful by paying them a bonus when their
bids criss-cross. But it is their \penalty procedure" that is closest to the
present mechanism in inducing truth-telling behavior.
Under it, the bargainers make simultaneous oers in a single stage, with
the proviso that the probability of implementation of a settlement is a func-
tion of the degree of overlap, if any, in the bids: the greater the overlap, the
higher this probability.1 It yields a surplus of 112 , which is 50% of the max-
imum possible surplus, so falls short of the 88.9% achieved by the present
1The probability of a certain settlement in the present mechanism increases as the
overlap of the stage 1 reserves increases, because a greater overlap increases the likelihood
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mechanism. And, unlike the present mechanism, the players never learn
whether their failure to settle was because (i) their reservation prices did
not criss-cross (as in stage 1), or (ii) they did criss-cross but probabilistic
implementation prevented a settlement (as in stage 2). In principle, how-
ever, they could be told whether (i) or (ii) prevented a settlement; if (ii),
they might be motivated to try again (as discussed below).
An advantage of the present mechanism is that the players always learn
if stage 2 is reached and, therefore, that there is an overlap interval and
the potential for a mutually protable settlement. While our mechanism
does not reveal the amount of regret|for example, by close the 2nd-stage
oers are to the overlap interval|we see no reason why the values of bS = S,bB = B; s, and b could not be revealed by the referee, making public the
reason why implementation failed in stage 2.
If the optimality of shading one's \bottom line" in stage 2 is the reason
that a settlement eluded the players, this outcome might motivate them,
or a third party, to try to nd a settlement|though, of course, under our
model the players must assign probability 0 to this eventuality during the
bargaining. But would they in good conscience walk away from the pos-
sibility of a mutually protable settlement that they know exists? While
failure is nal in the model, perhaps in reality the bargainers would have
good reason to jettison the conclusion of the mechanism and try again.2
that both players' stage 2 oers will fall into the overlap interval, ensuring a settlement.
2One possible solution would be to force a settlement at the mean of the reservation
prices if there is an overlap interval but no settlement in stage 2. But this is a dierent
mechanism, and truth-telling would not be optimal for the players in stage 1. Moreover,
our demonstration above that the optimal 2nd-stage oers are the form s = 1+
bS
2
and
b =
bB
2
would no longer apply, so neither the reserves nor the oers could be expected to
be related to the players' (truthful) reservation prices.
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